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Abstract—Skype is one of the most successful VoIP application
in the current Internet spectrum. One of the most peculiar
characteristics of Skype is that it relies on a P2P infrastructure
for the exchange of signaling information amongst active peers.
During August 2007, an unexpected outage hit the Skype overlay,
yielding to a service blackout that lasted for more than two days:
this paper aims at throwing light to this event.
Leveraging on the use of an accurate Skype classification
engine, we carry on an experimental study of Skype signaling
during the outage. In particular, we focus on the signaling
traffic before, during and after the outage, in the attempt to
quantify interesting properties of the event. While it is very
difficult to gather clear insights concerning the root causes of the
breakdown itself, the collected measurement allow nevertheless
to quantify several interesting aspects of the outage: for instance,
measurements show that the outage caused, on average, a 3-fold
increase of signaling traffic and a 10-fold increase of number of
contacted peers, topping to more than 11 million connections for
the most active node in our network – which immediately gives
the feeling of the extent of the phenomenon.
I. INTRODUCTION
The last few years witnessed VoIP telephony gaining a
tremendous popularity, as testified by the increasing number of
operators that are offering VoIP-based phone services. Skype
[1] is beyond doubt the most amazing example of this new
phenomenon: developed in 2002 by the creators of KaZaa,
it accounts for more than 4.4% of total VoIP traffic [2] and
recently reached over 170 millions of users, about 10 millions
of which are online at the same time.
One of the most interesting Skype peculiarities is that it
relies on a P2P infrastructure to support the control and man-
agement functions, which makes the system highly scalable,
avoiding single points of failure. A first key to Skype success
is its business model, which offers a large spectrum of useful
and free services in addition to optional features that can be
purchased at competitive rates. Another key to its success is
due to user-friendliness, which for many users translated into
the ease of configuration. A third characteristic stems from its
robustness: although running over the uncontrolled Internet,
Skype has been very reliable, almost like a PSTN network.
However, despite the Skype overlay has been fully func-
tional 24/7 during the last years, Skype suffered an unexpected
outage during the summer of 2007. Quoting the official
company blog [3], “On Thursday, 16th August 2007, the Skype
peer-to-peer network became unstable and suffered a critical
disruption. The disruption was triggered by a massive restart
of our users’ computers across the globe within a very short
time frame as they re-booted after receiving a set of patches
through Windows Update.” By exploiting our previous work
in which we devised a methodology that successfully tackles
the problem of Skype traffic identification [4], this work aims
at contributing to the understanding of the Skype outage
by providing several insights into Skype signaling traffic.
To gather a more comprehensive view of the phenomenon,
we compare it with “normal” signaling patterns, that were
observed before and after the outage.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to explore
an extreme event such as the disruption of an Internet scale
overlay. While it is impossible from pure passive measurement
to state ground truth about the reasons that lead to the outage,
we can still manage to precisely quantify some interesting
properties of the signaling traffic during the outage. For
example, on average we observe a 4-fold increase of the
number of signaling flows, a 3-fold increase of the packet
sending rate and a 10-fold increase of the number of contacted
peers. At the same time, the most active peer in our network
experienced a 10-fold increase of traffic amount and a 30-fold
increase of number of contacted peers, topping to more than
11 million of signaling connections during the whole 3-days
outage period – behaving thus as a lightning rod in a storm.
In addition, while the outage is said [3] to be related
to the distribution of a Windows update that forces a large
number of computers to reboot during the same period of
time, our investigation of the geolocation of the contacted
peers does not enlighten an evident synchronization in the
occurrence of anomalous peer behaviors. This possibly stems
from the asynchronous reboot events, due to delay in patch
download and installation. Finally, our measurement show
that the outage event actually entailed some changes in the
Skype overlay maintenance after the outage: for example, an
interesting change in the geographical location of the peers can
be observed, which results in an increase of its smoothness,
stability and geographical clustering of the overlay.
II. SKYPE SIGNALING PRIMER
Skype offers end users several free services: i) voice com-
munication, ii) video communication, iii) file transfer and iv)
chat services. The communication between users is established
using a traditional end-to-end IP paradigm, but Skype can
also route calls through a supernode to ease the traversal of
symmetric NATs and firewalls. Voice calls can also be directed
toward the PSTN using Skypein/Skypeout services, in which
case a fee is applied.
The main difference between most VoIP services and Skype
is that, except for user’s authentication which is performed
under a classical client-server architecture, the latter operates
on a P2P model. After the user (and the client) authentication,
all further signaling is performed on the P2P network, so
that Skype user’s informations (e.g. contact list and status,
preferences, etc.) are entirely decentralized and distributed
among P2P nodes. This allows the service to scale very easily
to large sizes, avoiding a costly centralized infrastructure.
From a protocol perspective, Skype uses a proprietary
solution which is difficult to reverse engineer due to extensive
use of both cryptography and obfuscation techniques. Though
Skype may rely on either TCP or UDP at the transport layer,
both signaling and communication data are preferentially
carried over UDP, although when a UDP communication is
impossible, Skype falls back to TCP. As a single random
port is selected during application installation (and it is never
changed, unless forced by the user), we introduce the follow-
ing definitions:
• A Skype client is identified by the (host IP address, Skype
UDP/TCP port) pair.
• A Skype flow is identified by using the traditional tuple
(IP source and destination addresses, UDP/TCP source
and destination ports, IP protocol type), in which at least
one endpoint is known to be a Skype client.
A flow starts when a packet with a new flow tuple is first
observed, while it is ended by either inactivity timeout1 or, in
case of TCP, by observing the tear-down sequence if present.
In this work, we focus on signaling flows carried over UDP
only, which constitute the largest and most interesting part
of Skype signaling traffic. Skype clients are identified as in
[4], so that it is possible to identify all flows that are either
originated by or directed to a Skype client.
Let us start the investigation of Skype signaling traffic by
depicting in Fig. 1 a few patterns that are representative of
a peer activity. We select two specific peers from our traces,
namely the most active peer (peer A, top plots) and a randomly
chosen active peer (peer B, bottom plots), inspecting half an
hour of their typical behavior before (left plots) and during
(right plots) the outage. Let p be the peer under observation.
Each dot in the picture corresponds to a packet in the trace: the
x-axis represents the packet arrival time since p’s first packet
is observed, and the y-axis reports the ID of the peer that
exchanged the packet with p: positive IDs are used for peers
that received a message from p, negative IDs for peers that sent
a message to p. The y-range corresponds thus to the number of
different Skype peers whom p is exchanging messages with.
Several interesting remarks can be gathered from Fig. 1:
indeed, though the semantic of the signaling activity cannot
1Results reported in this paper are derived setting the timer to 200 s: this
choice is justified by the fact that the largest inter packet gap within the
same flow that was ever observed is 180 s which is likely used by Skype as
keep-alive message to force the refresh of possible NAT entries.
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Fig. 1. Pictorial representation of Skype signaling activity
be inferred from purely passive measurement, its form can
be further differentiated [11]. A linear growth of the number
of contacted peers is noticeable: this hints to P2P network
discovery being carried on during most of the peer lifetime.
Interestingly, this part of the signaling activity is mainly
carried out by the transmission of a packet, to which (most of
the times) some kind of acknowledgment follows. Also, the
fact that p knows the address and port of valid (but previously
un-contacted) Skype peers means that the above information
is carried by signaling messages.
Still, some of the peers are contacted on a regular basis.
In the activity plot, any point lying in the zone below the
“discovery line” states that a peer is contacted several times
during p lifetime. This suggests the existence of two very
different kinds of the Skype signaling, namely:
• Probe traffic, which aims at network discovery: probe
flows are made of a single packet sent toward a peer,
to which a single reply packet possibly follows, but no
further message is exchanged between the peers pair.
• Non-probe traffic, which aims at the network mainte-
nance, including overlay and contact information man-
agement: non-probe flows are either flows longer than one
packet or sequence of single-packet probes, separated by
a time gap larger than the inactivity timeout.
We now focus on what happened during the outage. The
activity pattern during this critical period exhibits a massive
(peer A) and possibly unbalanced (peer B) growth over time,
which was on the contrary rather symmetrical before the
outage. During the outage, peer A contacts almost half a
million different clients in just 30 minutes (top-right plot),
whereas it used to contact about 15 thousand peers in normal
operation (top-left plot) – which corresponds to an almost 30-
fold increase. Considering peer B pattern (bottom plots), it
can be seen that the amount of incoming traffic experienced
a roughly 20-fold increase during the outage, but peer B
no longer replied, yielding to the asymmetric traffic profile
(bottom-right plot). However, notice that peer B was “alive”
during that time period, as the host (which we verified not to
be behind a NAT) actually had ongoing traffic.
TABLE I
FLOW, PACKETS AND BYTES TRAFFIC AMOUNT: UDP, SKYPE, TOP-10 AND TOP-1 SKYPE CLIENTS
Flows Packets IP Bytes
UDP Skype% Top-10 [%] Top-1 [%] UDP Skype% Top10% Top1% UDP Skype% Top-10 [%] Top-1 [%]
Before 3.3 · 107 75 75 22 7.5 · 107 57 71 12 2.1 · 1010 23 71 4
During 1.1 · 108 94 97 73 1.3 · 108 89 95 67 9.0 · 109 69 94 50
After 3.4 · 107 69 94 27 8.0 · 107 64 62 15 1.1 · 1010 51 60 12
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Fig. 2. The amount of Skype flows, packets and bytes for the periods under
analysis (1 minute window), considering UDP protocol only
III. THE SKYPE OUTAGE
In this section, we report results that were collected by
passive monitoring the campus access link at Politecnico di
Torino, where about 7000 different hosts are regularly used by
both students and staff members. It took more than two days
before the Skype engineer team managed to get the situation
back to normal since the problem was first acknowledged2
Concerning the outage period, we consider as start time 11AM
GMT which corresponds to the time instant at which we
begin to observe an anomalous (and massive) increase in the
amount of UDP traffic, see Fig. 2. The time at which the
Skype engineer team has blogged that the situation was back
to normal is instead considered as end time. For reference, we
also consider two different time intervals during August 2007,
i.e., the period corresponding to one week forward and one
week backward with respect to the outage period:
• Before: from Thu 09 (11AM) to Sat 11 (11AM)
• During: from Thu 16 (11AM) to Sat 18 (11AM)
• After: from Thu 23 (11AM) to Sat 25 (11AM)
A. Amount of Signaling Traffic
The amount of traffic that we observed during these periods
is depicted in Fig. 2, which reports the number of clients,
flows, packets and bytes observed over 1 minute long time
windows. First, it has to be noted that the traffic amount is
low, which was expected as August is a typical Italian vacation
period, with the 15th of August being the typical holiday peak.
2See ‘The words we’ve all been waiting for”, posted August the 18th at
11h00 GMT on [3] and “Problems with Skype login”, posted the August the
16th at 14h02 GMT.
At the same time, the number of internal active Skype clients
(top plot) is very similar before and after the outage, which
allows us to fairly compare measurements during different
weeks. A drastic reduction in the number of Skype clients is
observed during the outage event (although a slight decrease
was already in progress), to which it corresponds an anomalous
increase of UDP traffic (in term of flows and packets). During
this period UDP traffic largely outweighs TCP traffic, so that
it accounts for almost all incoming traffic. Before and after
the Skype outage, UDP traffic amount is normally much less
than the amount of TCP traffic typically observed. However,
after the Skype outage, the amount of Skype UDP traffic is
still little larger than before the anomalous event: this hints
to a possible more aggressive settings of the Skype protocol
parameters, in order to more promptly react to disruption of
the overlay network and thus to quickly recover from massive
distributed failures.
Tab. I reports further details concerning the amount of
traffic, expressed in terms of flows, packets and bytes. Some
interesting insights can be gathered considering the workload
that Skype clients generated during the outage. Table reports
the percentage of aggregate Skype traffic relatively to the total
UDP traffic (Skype% in the table). In addition, the percentage
of Skype signaling traffic that was directed to/generated by the
10% most active (Top10%) or to the 1% most active (Top1%)
Skype clients are reported as well. Considering the first row
of the table, it can be seen that, before the outage, Skype
normally accounted in our campus network for 23% of the IP
bytes, carried over 57% of the total UDP packets and 75% of
flows. The ten most active clients generated roughly 70% of
Skype flows, packets and bytes, while the most active client
was responsible for 22% of the flows, 12% of the packets and
only 4% of the exchanged bytes.
Conversely, during the outage, Skype traffic accounted for
almost the totality (94%) of UDP flows and for a very
significant portion of UDP packets and IP bytes (89% and
69% respectively). Furthermore, almost all the traffic was
generated/received by the 10 most active clients, with the most
active Skype node accounting for the 73% of all flows, 67% of
all packets and 50% of all bytes – a clear overload situation.
A first lesson is thus that the outage manifested itself as a
communication storm of significant amplitude, with few peers
that possibly acted as “lightning rods” during the storm.
B. Type of Signaling Traffic
We now investigate the type of signaling during the three
periods, reporting in Tab. II a breakdown of the external
peers that were contacted with non-probe versus probe traffic,
TABLE II
BREAKDOWN OF EXTERNAL PEER TYPE
Before During After
External Peer No. % No. % No. %
Probe 0.6·106 17% 5.6·106 14% 0.7·106 19%
Replied-Probe 2.5·106 69% 33.4·106 83% 2.3·106 67%
Non-Probe 0.5·106 14% 1.5·106 4% 0.5·106 14%
Total peers 3.6·106 40.5·106 3.5·106
Top-1 peers 0.4·103 11.3·106 0.3·103
discriminating in the latter case whether probe traffic received
a reply. Replied-probes represent the vast majority of the traffic
flows exchanged on the Skype overlay both during normal
conditions (roughly 70%) and during the anomalous event
(83%). Another interesting figure can be gathered concerning
the total number of external contacts: during the anomalous
event, internal peers exchanged traffic with about 40 millions
peers, which is more than one order of magnitude larger than
during normal functioning. Even more interesting is the fact
that the most active internal client contacted more than 11
millions of peers, a more than 30-fold increase compared
to the normal operation point (300k peers). From the above
observations, and given that each peer not only issued an
higher number of probes, but also received a reply to the probe
in most of the cases, we can conclude that the meshedness of
the overlay likely increased during the outage, and a few peers
explored a very large portion of the overlay.
Finally, notice that during the Skype outage the relative
importance of non-probe traffic diminishes, as joint effect of (i)
smaller number of stable connections and (ii) exploding num-
ber of probe connections, which exceeds a 10-fold increase. At
the same time, the absolute amount of non-probe traffic during
the outage also grows by a factor of 3: therefore, we can
conclude that packet probing represents the most important,
though not the only, component of the storm.
C. Internal Peers in the Storm
We next turn our attention to the internal peers, in the
attempt of understanding whether specific nodes (e.g., possibly
supernodes) have been more heavily concerned by the storm.
Since the majority of the traffic is constituted by probes, we
focus for the time being on the external probed received by
Skype peers in our network. As we have no reliable means to
identify Skype super-nodes, we prefer to measure the level of
peer signaling before the outage, and to compare peer activity
during the outage with their reference level.
More precisely, our aim is to assess whether the amount of
traffic increase has been roughly proportional to the “normal”
activity that peers carried out before and after the breakdown,
or if some peer might have experienced some unexpected
and unprecedented activity. On the one hand, we argue that
it would reasonable for the normally most active peers to
be contacted by a larger number of external peers (since
higher activity also likely translates into higher popularity). At
the same time, overlay disruption has been possibly caused
by the failure of many of such peers: therefore, it would
also be reasonable for peers that appear to be available and
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during the outage (x-axis) and mean rank before and after the outage (y-axis)
responsive during the outage to experience sudden popularity
(in the overlay attempt to react to the failure of highly popular
nodes). Our results, as we will show shortly, confirms that both
phenomena are indeed present.
Fig. 3 report a scatter plot of the peer rank r measured
according to the number of external probes received, where the
lower the rank the higher the contact (i.e., r = 1 correspond to
the most heavily contacted peer). Each (rD, rB) point in the
plot compares the rank of a peer during and before the outage.
It can be seen that in most of the cases the rank is roughly
mantained (since most points fall around the y = x line): in
other words, peers that were the most contacted before the
storm, are also the most contacted during the outage.
At the same time, a few peers, represented in the picture
with black bold dots, exhibit an anomalous behavior: more
precisely, we report a peer behavior as anomalous when its
rank ratio exceeds a given threshold rB/rD > 1.5. Such
“jumps” in the rank space correspond to peers that were not
popular before the outage, but that during the outage received
packet probes by an extremely high number of external peers.
Most notably, the second (5th) probe target during the outage,
receiving about 12% (2%) of all incoming probe packets is a
peer which ranked only 68th (107th) before the outage.
Thus, during the outage the number of incoming probes
roughly followed the normal peer popularity, except for a few
peers that may nevertheless attract a significant fraction of the
incoming probes.
D. External Peers in the Storm
Next, we turn our attention to external peers. We stress that,
since our analysis only involves a single vantage point, our
knowledge of external peers behavior is consequently limited:
indeed, we can observe only the portion of their traffic which
crosses the edge of the campus network (but are not able to
observe, e.g., the totality of their probe traffic).
As such, we are forced to focus on longer conversational
flows, and limitedly consider those external “Heavy Signalers”
(HS) clients that generated at least 25 flows directed to our
campus LAN. Tab. III reports several metrics relevant to HS
peers, namely: (i) the number of flows generated per HS and
directed to our internal clients, (ii) the number of different
TABLE III
HEAVY SIGNALER, FLOW AND PACKET SIZE STATISTICS
Before During After
Heavy Signaler (HS) Mean p95 Mean p95 Mean p95
Flows 106 11k 133 19k 117 11k
Internal Contact 3.8 232 5.7 133 4.4 218
Flows per Internal Contact 60.8 154 37.1 75 64.2 170
Traffic Statistics Mean p95 Mean p95 Mean p95
Flow Size In: 1.68 3 1.08 1 2.06 3
(packets) Out: 1.69 3 1.18 3 2.21 3
Packet Size In: 86.8 346 36.0 38 95.3 349
(Bytes) Out: 99.9 435 60.1 53 100.3 430
internal peers contacted by each HS and the (iii) number of
flows sent by the same HS toward the same internal peer.
During the outage, these HS peers generate roughly 30%
more signaling flows than usual, with top 5% HS peers
generating more than 19k of flows toward internal clients,
which is almost the double with respect to the normal behavior.
Thus, outage apparently triggered another type of reaction, as
it actually intensifies the flow of information between peers
that were reachable during the storm.
However, while HS peers contact on average more internal
peers than usual (5.7 versus 3.8–4.4), the top 5% HS peers
actually contact fewer internal peers than usual (133 versus
218–232). Moreover, both the average and the 95th percentile
of the number of flows sent by HS peers to their internal
contacts is halved with respect to normal situation. Taking
into account packet size and flow length statistics as well,
reported in the bottom part of Tab. III, we can conclude that,
during the outage a smaller amount of information, carried by
shorter flows consituted by smaller packets, was spread out to
a greater number of peers. This is possibly due to the fact that
peers keep asking questions (e.g., which reliable super-node
should I contact?) each other but get no answer.
E. Traffic Source Geolocation
In this section, we analyze the geographical location of
the contacted peers, in the attempt to collect evidence of a
“outage wave,” which possibly occurred as a consequence of
contemporary restart of PCs running Skype. To geolocate the
Skype clients, we queried the geographical location of the
above addresses using HostIP [12], a public, open and free
IP address database. Due to the significant number of external
hosts, sampling has been applied to reduce the size of the
dataset to explore. More specifically, the initial 14 hours of
each period are considered, in which the first 1,000 external
peers observed every 5 minutes are geolocated, yielding to a
total of 168k samples per period.
The distribution of the peers timezone is depicted in Fig. 4,
which reports the percentage of peers as a function of the
time-lag with respect to the GMT; for reference purpose, the
top x-axis also reports a few reference countries. Though
the breakdown is very similar across the three time periods,
an interesting discrepancy arises. First, as already observed
in [11], the picture strongly suggests that peer selection is
geographically driven. For all time periods, more than 40% of
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external peers have the same timezone of the vantage point
in Italy (i.e., GMT+1, which is common to most European
countries). However, a closer look at the picture reveals
that, before the outage, the geographical clusterization among
GMT+1 peers was significantly smaller, since there were a
higher number of peers with time zones different from GMT+1
(e.g., see the GMT-5 peak corresponding to US East cost,
Brazil, etc.). Thus, a Skype client preferably selects “closer”
peers, and this preference has been strengthened after the
outage, possibly due to different parameter settings.
Finally the time evolution of the GMT-lag is depicted in
Fig. 5 for the most significant time zones early observed
(namely, GMT-9, GMT-5, GMT and GMT+1). Each dot in
the picture represents the number of peers in each timezone
measured every 5 min period, where a smoothed bezier fitting
of the dataset is reported for the ease of visualization. It
is possible to notice that before and after the outage, the
peer distribution is almost uncorrelated with the time. On
the contrary, a clear transient effect is present during the
Skype outage, with an evident increase in the number of
contacted peers at GMT+1, to which it corresponds a decrease
of peers at GMT-5. This transient phase reaches its maximum
at 1 PM GMT+1, after which the number of GMT+1 peers start
decreasing and the number of peers at GMT-5 starts increasing
(this may be due to peers at GMT-5 slowly coming back after
the windows update process, i.e., at 7 AM for GMT-5). Still,
one would expect the same behavior to show at different times
when looking at other set of peers with common time zone
(e.g., GMT and GMT-9), which is however not true.
As such we therefore cannot find clear evidence of the
massive, synchronized PC restart as root cause for overlay
disruption. A possible reason to the “desynchronization” may
be due to the fact that PC have to download and install
windows updates, which introduces different delays spreading
the reboot process over time.
IV. RELATED WORK
As the use of Skype spreads, the interest of the research
community increased as well [4]–[11]. The identification of
Skype traffic has been the object of [4], [5]. In our pre-
vious work [4], we devised a classification engine for the
identification of Skype sessions, by exploiting both stochastic
characteristics of the voice flow and statistics of the packet
payload. As a side effect of the fine-grained classification,
we are able to discriminate the different flavors of the VoIP
traffic generated by the Skype application, and to precisely
individuate signaling traffic. Authors of [5] only focus on
relayed traffic, using Skype as an example of application.
Other work, such as [6]–[8] focus on the characterization
of Skype traffic and its users: [6] presents an experimental
study of the Skype churn rate and the network workload,
limitedly considering relayed sessions only. Authors in [7]
focus instead on the evaluation of the QoS level provided by
Skype calls, whereas our previous work [8] investigates the
Skype congestion control mechanism, i.e., how does Skype
react to varying network condition.
Related to this work are [9]–[11], which concern mainly the
Skype protocols. Authors of [9] provide a very deep under-
standing of Skype internals, including many details gathered
from a partial reverse engineering of Skype protocol and
application, with a special focus on security issues. From a
low-level inspection of Skype datagram, authors argue that
almost everything is ciphered. An active methodology is
instead used on [10] to provide an overview of Skype design
and functions under several different network setups. Authors
uncover functions such as the bootstrap, the authentication
and login phases, the traversal of NATs and firewalls, the call
establishment and tear-down. Finally, in [11], we present a
preliminary investigation of Skype signaling traffic.
To summarize, all previous papers completely ignore Skype
signaling traffic except [10], [11], whose focus is however
rather different from the one of the present work, since
they focus on the normal behavior of the Skype network, as
opposite as the analysis of a pathological situation, which is
indeed the main objective of this work.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated the Skype outage event, adopting
a passive measurement approach that focused on monitoring
Skype signaling traffic before, during and after the phe-
nomenon. While the collected measurement allow to precisely
quantify several interesting aspects of the phenomenon, it
is however very difficult to gather clear insights, that either
confirm or deny any strong evidence on the root cause of
the breakdown itself. Nevertheless, we believe that this work
quantifies and decribes a number of interesting aspects con-
cerning the disruption of an Internet-scale P2P overlay, which
we briefly summarize here.
First, the outage manifested itself as a UDP communication
storm of significant amplitude: during the outage we observe,
on average, a 4-fold increase of the number of flows, a 3-
fold increase of packet sending rate and a 10-fold increase
of the number of contacted peers with respect to normal
P2P operation. Moreover, during the storm some peer may
have acted as “lightning rods,” incurring in exceptionally
intense signaling activity – e.g., in our network, the most
active client experienced a 10-fold increase of traffic amount,
and a 30-fold degree of number of contacted peers, topping
to more than 11 million of overlay connections. The most
important component of the storm is thus constituted by an
intense probing activity, which both increased the overlay
meshedness (as the number of contacts per peer increases)
as well as producing some severe hotspot (as the number of
contacts exploses for some peer). Moreover, while we verified
that the number of incoming probes roughly followed the
“normal” peer activity, we also observed that a few peers
may nevertheless have experienced unprecedented popularity,
attracting a significant fraction of the incoming probes.
At the same time, packet probing does not represent the
only component of the storm: indeed, the absolute amount
of non-probe exchanges increased significantly, as the storm
also intensified the flow of information between reachable
peers. More precisely, we observed that a smaller amount of
information, carried by shorter flows constituted by smaller
packets, is spread out to a greater number of peers during the
outage. Finally, our findings also suggest that some parameters
of the Skype overlay maintenance may have changed: for
instance, the peer selection mechanism exhibits an increased
geographical clustering after the outage.
REFERENCES
[1] Skype Web site, http://www.skype.com
[2] “International carriers’ traffic grows despite Skype popularity”, Tele-
Geography Report and Database, Available on line http://www.
telegeography.com/, Dec. 2006.
[3] Skype Heartbeats Archives, http://heartbeat.skype.com http://heartbeat.
skype.com/2007/08/
[4] D.Bonfiglio, M.Mellia, M. Meo, D.Rossi, P.Tofanelli, “Revealing Skype
Traffic: when randomness plays with you”, ACM Sigcomm’07, Kyoto,
Japan, Aug. 2007.
[5] K. Suh, D. R. Figuieredo, J. Kurose, D. Towsley, “Characterizing and
detecting relayed traffic: A case study using Skype.”, IEEE Infocom’06,
[6] S. Guha, N. Daswani and R. Jain, “An Experimental Study of the Skype
Peer-to-Peer VoIP System”, 5th International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer
Systems, IP2PS’06, Santa Barbara, CA, Feb. 2006.
[7] K. Ta Chen, C. Y. Huang, P. Huang, C. L. Lei “Quantifying Skype User
Satisfaction”, ACM Sigcomm’06, Pisa, Italy, Sep. 2006.
[8] D. Bonfiglio, M. Mellia, M. Meo, N. Ritacca and D. Rossi, “Tracking
Down Skype Traffic,” IEEE Infocom’08, Phoenix, AZ, USA, Apr. 2008.
[9] P. Biondi, F. Desclaux, “Silver Needle in the Skype.” Black Hat
Europe’06, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, Mar. 2006.
[10] S. A., Baset, H. Schulzrinne, “An Analysis of the Skype Peer-to-Peer
Internet Telephony Protocol.” IEEE Infocom’06, Barcelona, Spain, Apr.
2006.
[11] D.Rossi, M.Mellia, M.Meo, “Following Skype Signalling Footstep”,
IEEE IT-NEWS’08 (QOS-IP), Venice, Italy, Feb. 2008.
[12] http://www.hostip.info
